In Ukraine, there are no quick fixes

In Ukraine, there are no quick fixes

In Ukraine, there are no quick fixes

By Mr John Erath , Former Government Fellow and current Digital Fellow, Global Fellowship Initiative, GCSP

The war in Ukraine, or rather Russia's unjustified attack on Ukraine, has been going on for over one month now, and shows no sign of a quick or easy conclusion.  It is not, however, too soon for many to ask how it can be ended as soon as possible.  This is, of course, the goal: to end as early as can be managed the suffering of the Ukrainian people and the death toll increasingly being visited on both sides.  Russia's irresponsible nuclear threats add to the urgency of finding a solution.  It is part of the real tragedy of Ukraine that an easy fix might not be the best course of action.

The two sides' positions make any kind of ceasefire unlikely.  Ukraine, understandably, wants an end to Russian occupation and refuses to accept Moscow dictating how it should arrange its relations with the West.  Russia sees a western oriented Ukraine as an existential threat and will not tolerate a government in Kyiv that could decide to move Ukraine closer to NATO and the European Union.  Think about what this would mean to Putin.  A potentially prosperous, democratic Ukraine would stand in strong contrast to a struggling, authoritarian Russia next door and give the lie to the doctrine of Russian exceptionalism on which Putin has relied to maintain power.  Russia's dependence on fossil fuel exports makes its prospects even more uncertain as others increasingly turn toward renewable energy.  “Losing” Ukraine at this point would be a direct threat to Putinism, the idea that Russian peoples (including Ukrainians) require authoritarian government, therefore Putin is willing to go to almost any lengths to avoid this fate.  Ukraine feels, if anything, more strongly that Russian victory would be a de facto end of its nationhood, making it unlikely to give up.

The war has imposed high costs on both parties, which will only increase with time, so it is possible that positions may soften.  On March 24, High Representative Borrell stated that Russia showed “no interest” in negotiation until it could do so from a position of military strength.  In the meantime, the rest of the world can only wait until conditions become favorable for a negotiated settlement.  Looking ahead, there are at least two reasons for caution, lest the desire to do the right thing have inadvertent negative consequences.  

First, it is possible that the two sides will grow tired of bloodshed and agree to a ceasefire, similar to that which prevailed in the Donbas since 2014 – “ceasefire” being somewhat of a misnomer as shooting across the line of control was generally a daily occurrence.  The difficulty with such an arrangement, would be that both sides would still live under the conditions that led to Russian aggression, and both would assume that another war was in the future, leading them to prepare for even greater levels of violence.  Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, there have been frozen conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, to the detriment of all those countries.  Freezing the Ukraine conflict could prove even worse in the long term, especially since Russia would have threatened to use nuclear weapons and still come out ahead, adding value to the continued possession of nuclear weapons.

Additionally, there is the question of how a ceasefire would come about.  Already, well-meaning commentators have urged an end to the fighting, but have stated that there should be a “face-saving” way out for Putin, generally some piece of Ukraine for peace.  Leaving aside the absurdity of rewarding a dictator for aggression, such a “solution” could ignore the wishes of the Ukrainian people.  Therein lies the danger.  Russia disdains high level talks with the Ukrainian government but, should its military remain stalled, could agree to a third party suggestion of a ceasefire in place, likely coupled with a demand for the resignation of the Ukrainian government.  U.S. and major European leaders, with visions of Nobels dancing in their heads, could decide to back such a package and pressure Ukraine to accept.  In essence, the fate of Ukraine would be taken out of the hands of the Ukrainian people and decided in Washington and/or Brussels.

When faced nightly with images of bombed hospitals, thousands of refugees and the use of high explosives near nuclear power plants, it is reasonable to want to end the violence as rapidly as possible and in whatever way might be possible.  Doing so, however, should not ignore the wishes of those that have suffered most: the people of Ukraine.  While it would be reprehensible for Western leaders to seek to fight the war to the last drop of Ukrainian blood, they must seek a balance between wanting to conclude, or at least scale back, the violence and possibly adding to Ukraine's long term anguish.  This is a messy war.  Ending it will not be easy, but a starting point should be understanding the wishes and interests of the Ukrainian victims.

 

Disclaimer: The views, information and opinions expressed in the written publications are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those shared by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy or its employees. The GCSP is not responsible for and may not always verify the accuracy of the information contained in the written publications submitted by a writer.

John Erath returns to GCSP after a two-year assignment on the U.S. National Security Council, where he was responsible for European issues. In this capacity, he focused on cooperation with NATO and the EU, as well as heading White House efforts to improve stability in the Balkans. He has thirty years of diplomatic experience and who began his career in the 1990s working in what was then Yugoslavia. He was later seconded to the OSCE in Kosovo and the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo. Subsequently, he covered the Balkans at the U.S. Mission the NATO and for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Erath also has extensive experience in arms control and non-proliferation, having worked on the delegation for adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and led the U.S. Delegation to the Wassenaar Arrangement General Working Group. He has also held diplomatic positions in India and Brazil. Most recently, he headed the political-military affairs office at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Mr. Erath is a graduate of Georgetown University and has a master’s degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College in Washington. He is the author of several articles on military history and three plays. He is married to Tara Erath, State Department Chair at the Eisenhower School of the National Defense University, and has two children.