Geneva, 10-11 October 2024
Chair’s Summary

On 10 and 11 October 2024, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) launched a new Space Security Dialogue. This is a summary of the first meeting of this new track 2 process. It has been prepared by GCSP as Chair and represents their best efforts to capture the key recommendations from the dialogue and is not a consensus document.

General views

Overall, the experts stressed that concerns over a breakdown in space activities and order, and the consequences this would have for all on earth, were growing. Yet, there was still no agreement amongst the major space faring nations about what the problem was. More needed to be done to understand each other’s threat perceptions. The major powers needed to take the lead on this. Smaller states needed to be engaged more, to reduce resistance to addressing the challenges from the major powers. At a time of multiple global crises, space security was not being given the priority it needed. The importance of existing space law and international humanitarian law (IHL) was repeatedly stressed.

During the dialogue, the experts discussed the following topics:

Threat perceptions and strategic stability

The salience of nuclear weapons was growing. Counter space capabilities were increasing. Destructive attacks on space-based assets, such as nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3), were a major concern. This was detrimental to strategic stability. It could negatively impact crisis stability too, as the best form of communications with the military during a crisis was through space assets.

Entanglement was another area of concern. Interfering with space-based assets that have a dual purpose (conventional and nuclear) could create a crisis, even if the intention was not to undermine NC3. The risks here had not been meaningfully addressed.
New technology, such as hypersonic missiles and high-frequency early warning radar, could also have a big impact on strategic stability.

Many experts spoke of the special obligation that China, Russia, and the United States had to discuss space security and address each other’s threat perceptions. Space security should be centred in future strategic stability and arms control dialogues between them.

Mega constellations being used to help one side in a conflict could also be destabilising. As they were hard to counter, they made it much harder to stop an adversary's military communications. Some saw this as an additional threat vector and wanted a dialogue to discuss the implications.

Smaller states did not see this through the nuclear lens, the biggest concern for them was access to data and the fear that the assets they depended on for that data could be harmed. Countries without space programmes should be included in threat perception discussions.

International coordination on space traffic management and space situational awareness

Better coordination in space would lead to safer operations, providing the services to help deliver the Sustainable Development Goals. Space traffic management was also the first line of defence for keeping space sustainable and secure. A mechanism for sharing data would benefit all, yet no-one had so far put a proposal on the table.

Satellite operators needed to be proactive in sharing information, have clear communication protocols and provide points of contact. States needed to use domestic legislation to force/incentivise operators to share information. For political and competition reasons, no one data sharing system would likely become the solution, but a platform into which they could all share data was possible and much needed. The World Meteorological Organization’s mandatory data sharing platform could provide a useful model.

National proposals for data sharing were welcomed, but there were fears that not all countries would be able to participate and concerns around the potential for disinformation.

Current and future legal framework

Existing space law and guidelines already gave space a solid legal architecture. The principles set out in the Outer Space Treaty (OST) gave space its constitutional framework. More prominence should be given to the OST, with its prohibitions on the militarization of space and its consultative procedures, such as on due regard.

In addition to space law, there was a wide range of international law that applied, such as the UN Charter and its prohibition on the use of force and IHL, which, as customary international law, applied to everyone.

Arguably, Direct Ascent Anti Satellite Testing (DA ASAT) was a breach of the OST, but states were not calling each other out on it. No country was opposed in principle to the DA ASAT moratorium; however, political considerations and lack of trust made some sceptical about the sincerity of the ban. Addressing the issue of research and development of capability could help encourage others to sign up. There was also the question of why not regulate other space weapon capabilities in a similar way as DA ASAT. Some felt that we should all be able to agree that deliberately creating debris was bad. If dialogue could continue around the ban on the DA ASAT, this might start a positive chain of events.

Rendezvous and proximity operations

Many felt that, given that discussions on rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) had not resolved the question of what proximity meant, it was better to tackle the issue through promoting transparency and consultation (for example through Article 9 of the OST). Indeed, the security concerns were not so much about the distance an asset was from another, but more about what the asset in question was doing.

Further discussion would be needed on how transparency could be achieved. Would it be sufficient to notify that you were coming near another space object, but without the need to explain what you were doing? How would this address the issue of states using proximity operations to influence or force actions by another? If states were not being transparent, what would the consequences be?

Could the discussion around self-defence zones be revisited? Would inspections or codes of conduct help? Many felt that more countries should issue their own guidelines on due regard.
In the future it may become difficult to identify proximity related concerns, the threats may come from interference and unseen, silent damage.

The experts also discussed the need for a new framework on space debris. Active Debris Removal (ADR) was needed, but there was no immediate market for it. States would need to do this themselves. Could an international fund for ADR be established?

Obligations

There were many existing obligations in the four core space treaties and international law, but states had been reluctant to define what they meant in practice and had refused to call out non-compliance. For example, slow or non-registration of satellites; or harmful interference; or lack of due regard. A mechanism was needed whereby states could discuss and seek to resolve questions around compliance. The question was how to incentivise states to come to an agreement.

Some felt that there was a high bar for consultations under Article 9 of the OST. It was hard to prove harmful interference, making attribution difficult. Countries would also be cautious about calling out Allies or reciprocal accusations. However, without any agreed state practice, the interpretation of the obligation was arguably weakened. There was a suggestion that the International Court of Justice be asked to give an Advisory Opinion on how to use Article 9. More clarity on how IHL applied in space (for example using manuals) would also be beneficial.

More discussion would be needed around possible obligations for legally binding instruments, such as provisions not to destroy, injure, disturb, or alter the trajectory of space objects of other states without their consent.

The experts also discussed suggestions that an agreement be sought on not targeting space infrastructure that provided services to civilians. It was felt that this was not practical, as services between civilian and military domains crossed over so much. Existing law, such as IHL, would also apply, so a new agreement was perhaps not necessary.

Dual use and verification

There was broad agreement that difficulties arising from dual use and verification should not be an impediment to future agreements on space security. If more effort was made to define space activities clearly, then we could explore what aspects might be verifiable and how to build a verification system for future agreements. One idea could be leveraging elements such as infrasound networks, which can detect space and missile launches.

Verification needed common access to space situational awareness. In the current geopolitical climate this was challenging.
Cases of harmful interference were increasing – particularly jamming and spoofing. However, these could only be investigated if they were reported.

Much good work had been done on Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs). More could be done to advance these, with a strengthened role for the United Nations.

If the major space faring nations exchanged their space policies regularly, this would be an important TCBM.

Lessons on monitoring and verification could be learned from other fora, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation or the Hague Code of Conduct.

Space objects could be used as weapons, so the burden should be on the operators to prove that their objects were for peaceful purposes. Reaching common understandings on behaviours would also help.

Areas for future discussion

The Chair proposed that the following five areas could be considered for further, more in-depth, discussion at future meetings:

• Rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) – further discussion is needed to identify how transparency and information sharing could reduce the concerns associated with RPO.
• Direct Assent Anti-Satellite Testing (DA ASAT) – given that no country is speaking against this moratorium in principle, further discussion could map out how to increase the numbers signing up, in particular the countries who actually have the capability to do DA ASAT.
• Mega constellations – some countries want a dialogue on this topic. Given the difficulty of discussing this in a track 1 setting, there could be benefit to initial discussions in a track 2 dialogue.
• International coordination mechanism for sharing data – further discussion of space traffic management and space situational awareness could help generate a proposal to be put before track 1 actors.
• Enforcement of existing obligations – further discussion is needed on how to raise issues around non-compliance and creating a consultative mechanism.