An interview with Dr Roman Krakovsky

Dr Roman Krakovsky is a lecturer at the University of Geneva’s Global Studies Institute. He recently publised the essay Le Populisme en Europe centrale et orientale. Un avertissement pour l'avenir ? where he discusses Central Europe and European populism.  Read below for more insights in this one-on-one interview with the GCSP.

1. You refer to Central Europe as a “laboratory of European populism”, what do you mean by that?

One of today’s most virulent centres of European populism is situated in Central Europe. Viktor Orbán in Hungary is proposing to rebuild the national community according to the principles of illiberal democracy, positioning himself as one of the world leaders of this alternative to liberalism. Others such as Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland advocate more traditional conservative policies. This illiberal turn is not a specificity of this part of the Europe. In France, UK or the United States, similar populist leaders and movements are placing national interests above everything else. When the French conservative public intellectual Eric Zemmour affirms: “When you’re 1% of the world population, and when we have 1.5 billion Africans at our door who, in the name of human rights, want to come to France, I say that human rightsare the death of France,” he is not so much different from Orbán or Kaczyński. The difference lies in the fact that populism in Central Europe is more virulent and some of its leaders are already in power.

2. Why is Central Europe a hotbed for European populism? What unites and fuels this community?

It reveals above all a fear for the existence of the nation, whose protection becomes imperative. This sentiment is the cumulative effect of multiple factors.

The first is the integration of this region after the fall of communist regimes into a globalised world and its consequences. Privatizations and the introduction of market mechanisms led to a profound restructuring of economies and exposed these countries to global competition. It often unleashed a serious economic crisis, particularly in the Balkans and Russia, and brought high unemployment and a dramatic increase in social inequalities.

The second factor is a dramatic demographic crisis. With the economic crisis and political instability, mortality increased significantly, especially among men, while fertility literally collapsed. The number of children per woman halved in just a few years in the 1990s. At the same time, these countries have been experiencing a mass population exodus. It is often the youngest, most educated and most enterprising people who leave. Since 1989, Romania has lost 3.2 million inhabitants, or 14% of its population. Moldova has lost 17%, Ukraine 18%, Bosnia and Herzegovina 20%, Bulgaria and Lithuania 21%, and Latvia 25%. According to United Nations, 10 countries in the world whose populations are expected to decline most rapidly in the coming decades are all in Central and Eastern Europe, and these countries can expect to see a 15% or greater reduction by 2050.

The third factor is geopolitical instability. Liberal democracy and the market economy were imported into the region by the United States and the European Union. Washington and Brussels found themselves in the roles of guardians and tutors. However, since the 2000s, these two powers have been sinking into a deep crisis. In the US, following the 2008 financial crisis, the White House reconsidered its engagement with its allies. In Europe, Islamist attacks, the 2008 financial crisis, Brexit and the “migrant crisis” have considerably weakened the EU. At the same time, new powers such as China and Russia emerged and consider Central and Eastern Europe as a doorway to the EU, putting these countries under political or economic pressure.

Finally, the “migrant crisis” of 2015-2016 has led to a radicalisation of the various groups that consider themselves marginalized by the existing social order r. The low amount of support that Western liberal democracies have provided to the region’s countries to manage the humanitarian crisis caused by the influx of migrants made them appear as those who, in the name of equality, demands the same rights as everyone else, but to the detriment of an excluded or marginalised mass of people situated on the Eastern margins of the EU. Because of its cultural and religious differences, migrants also represent a danger to European culture that is based on ideological values linked to Christianity, according to Orbán or Kaczyński.

These different factors have elicited a feeling of fear for the existence of the nation. The whole of Europe seems to be affected by this “existential crisis”, especially since the economic crisis and the UK’s vote on Brexit called into question the European project. But its effects are now most visible in Central and Eastern Europe, most likely because this region is made up of mainly small nations, “whose very existence may be put in question at any moment. They could disappear and they know it”, as Milan Kundera points out in A Kidnapped West.

The various criticisms of the system find a common denominator: liberalism. To overcome the existential crisis and strengthen the national community, it is indeed necessary to break with the existing system and to rebuild the community according to “illiberal” principles, declare leaders in Central Europe. In July 2014, at the Tusnádfürdő summer university in Romania, Orbán explained that “the new state […] does not deny foundational values of liberalism, [such] as freedom […]. But it does not make this ideology a central element of state organization”. In September 2015, he affirms that in the “illiberal era”, we are first “responsible for our children, then for our parents […]. Then come those with whom we live in our village or town. Then comes our country, and then everyone else may come”.

3. What solutions could be applied to ease this trend?

This “existential crisis” and the populist responses to it are not specific to Central Europe. In France, the Netherlands and the United States, similar populist leaders and movements are emerging, placing national interests above everything else. What the French conservative public intellectual Eric Zemmour affirms is not so much different from Orbán.

If there is a Central European specificity, it is a form of existential fragility that can be noticed more easily and earlier here than elsewhere, perhaps because of the intermediate position of these countries between the West and the East. In this light, Central and Eastern Europe can be seen as a prediction of European fate, and what is happening there today can be considered a warning for the rest of the continent.

But it might be also a place where the way out of this crisis will be elaborated. Thousands of people are taking to the streets in Poland and Hungary to defend the constitution and women’s rights. In Slovakia and in Czech Republic, people march to protect the freedom of the press after the assassination in February 2018 of journalist Ján Kuciak and his partner. In Romania and Bulgaria, people demonstrate against the corruption that plagues their countries. Everywhere, these are the biggest public demonstrations since 1989, which held the largest demonstrations since World War Two.

This tremendous energy reveals a new social dynamic, and we should follow closely what is happening on the streets of Warsaw, Budapest or Bratislava, because the renewal of democracy will most likely come from there. In this sense, Central and Eastern Europe might be considered as a sort of “laboratory of Europe“ where the European crisis takes place and where the cures for it might be elaborated.

The opinions expressed in this article are the interviewee’s own and do necessarily reflect the views of the GCSP.