Switzerland in the chair: Lessons from the past, prospects for the future with Ambassador Thomas Greminger, Executive Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

I would like to make few reflections on lessons learned from ten years ago when Switzerland chaired the OSCE. I don’t want to do this from an historical perspective – I have done that elsewhere. But I want to highlight a few lessons that I think can be relevant for today, and for looking ahead. 

I have around 7 minutes so I will make 7 points. 

First, how to convince a country to chair the OSCE? 

One must explain convincingly the national interest, particularly to those who need to agree on funding the chairpersonship – politicians, parliamentarians, and the general public. Obviously also the Minister for Foreign Affairs since it is a heavy burden – but also a great opportunity. Recall that Didier Burkhalter, who was chair at the time, was rather hesitant in the run-up, but got into the role, and by the end was a good crisis manager, a great host of a quite challenging Ministerial meeting and was even voted man of the year (ahead of Roger Federer). 

Related to that is a sense of responsibility. I know that North Macedonia, Malta, Austria and others felt that strongly – and Finland in relation to leading the organization in an important anniversary year, both for Finland and the OSCE. We certainly felt that sense of responsibility when putting forward our candidacy. 

I know there are sometimes concerns about the financial costs of chairing the OSCE; but the investment is much smaller than, say, a UN Security Council campaign or, frankly, buying more weapons and ammunition. And the impact can reap big dividends, for “soft power” but also for contribution to peace in Europe. 

Second: the need to be well prepared. After two years of preparation our team was well prepared – for almost anything. Just not “little green men” appearing in Crimea. But the fact that we were prepared meant that we could adapt quickly. 

I have recently been to Helsinki and talked to the in-coming Task Force, and I know that my Finnish colleagues have been travelling extensively and preparing. This is key – not least to expect the unexpected (for better or for worse). 

It is therefore all the more remarkable that Malta, with so little time to prepare, has been doing such a great job in steering the ship. 

My advice for future chairs is: look over the horizon, use strategic foresight, and have options in the drawer. Think-tanks like ours and the network of OSCE experts can help. 

Third, be in the room where it happens. You may recall that in March 2014, Foreign Minister Burkhalter proposed at the UNSC the creation of a Contact Group for Ukraine with the membership of the EU, US, Ukraine and Russia. This so-called Geneva format transformed into the Normandy Format comprised of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia. As a result, decisions were often taken in the Normandy Format that the OSCE was supposed to implement, but it was only informed afterwards. In the future, if the OSCE is called on to play a roll in Ukraine or in relation to the post-war European security order it should be at the table. By the way, this makes the OSCE much more interesting for capitals – including Troika ministers. 

Fourth, and related to this, have a clear division of responsibility between the OSCE and other partners. At the time of the SMM, there was clear division of responsibility between the UN and the OSCE – and this strengthened the OSCE’s profile as a regional arrangement of the UN. There were also good links with the ICRC concerning assisting civilians in Ukraine, for example with humanitarian referrals. I am not saying that we will get back to the type of Platform for Cooperative Security foreseen in the 1999 Istanbul Summit document, but the OSCE should play a key role in providing an inclusive space for a wide number of potential actors with a stake in rebuilding European security – organizations and not only participating States. 

Fifth, escalate diplomacy. There is alot of talk in the context of the war in Ukraine about the potential dangers of horizontal and vertical escalation. Some pundits even talk about the need to “escalate in order to de-escalate”. One key lesson learned from Switzerland’s chairpersonship of the OSCE was the need to escalate diplomacy. When we were negotiating the mandate of the SMM – but also on other occasions – we raised the level of engagement and urgency from Vienna to capitals, but also from ambassadors to foreign ministers, and even on a couple of occasions to the level of Presidents. It is therefore crucial not only to have a good triangular relationship between the chair team in Vienna, the Task Force and the SG, but also to prepare for the possibility of ratcheting up vertical pressure, for example in the build up to the Ministerial Council but also in anticipation of pivotal decisions in 2025. 

Sixth, be bold. Who would have thought in 2013 that a couple of years later the OSCE would have over 1000 monitors in Ukraine? The day may come in the near future when the OSCE is again called upon to play an important role; that opportunity should be seized with both hands. 

Seventh, keep open channels of dialogue. I know it is not politically popular, but we need to keep open channels of communication – particularly in these difficult times. Diplomats are paid to talk to their enemies, not their friends. It is a risky business – and frankly I have been criticized for it, but I maintain the need for dialogue – not least as a way of making deterrence more credible, and for exploring ways for sides to manage their relations without going over the edge of the abyss. 

As Director of GCSP, I have put a strong emphasis on platforms for informal dialogue. Creating space for Russia and the US to talk about strategic stability or deconfliction in Syria. Facilitating High North Talks to improve Arctic security. And getting together experts from Russia, Ukraine, Europe and the United States to discuss the future of European security. 

Many organizations say, under current circumstances that there can be “no business as usual”. True enough. But then we have to be creative and adaptive. Ten years ago we, as the Swiss chair, didn’t have the Structured Dialogue. Once created, we missed using it properly. Moving forward, we need to think and act creatively about such formats. 

One concluding remark. I understand that Bern is weighing its options for putting forward its official candidacy to chair the OSCE in 2026. I have spoken to colleagues in the FDFA and encouraged this idea. We can expect significant changes in the next few years, hopefully for the better – but certainly with an impact on all OSCE participating States. Switzerland rose to the challenge in a pivotal year in 2014; I am quite sure it could do it again in 2026.