The German federal election will be held on 26 September – and this will be a special one. After four election cycles since 2005, the current German chancellor, Angela Merkel, is not running for office again, after 16 years of chancellorship. The challenges that have emerged during Merkel’s term in office, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic and the ever-increasing effects of climate change, have led to an almost universal longing for change in Germany. The former leading parties – the conservatives (CDU/CSU, “The Blacks”) and the socialists (SPD, “The Reds”) – have lost their previous status as “people’s parties”, and other parties continue to gain more support and votes, like the green party (Alliance 90/The Greens) and the far-right nationalist party (Alternative for Germany (AfD, “The Blues”). This means that this election has the potential to result in two major changes in Germany’s government: those of the leading party and the country’s leader. One thing is certain: even if Merkel’s party – the leading party for the last 16 years – gains sufficient votes to form a new coalition (and some form of coalition will have to be formed), change is inevitable. When we consider the polls regarding this political race, new leadership and coalitions that once seemed highly unlikely suddenly seem possible.

The current situation

Recent polls¹ are suggesting the following six possible coalition outcomes (note that the party named first in the possible coalition combinations will be the strongest and will be asked to nominate the next chancellor) ¹

1. a Red-Black-Green coalition – the so-called “Kenya Coalition”² – containing the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD); the centre-right Union party comprising the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU); and the centre-left green party Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen);
2. a Red-Black-Yellow coalition – the so-called “Germany Coalition”³ – containing the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the centrist Free Democratic Party (FDP);
3. and with the next lowest possible number of seats in the Bundestag: a Red-Green-Yellow coalition – the so-called “Traffic Light Coalition”⁴ – containing the SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens, and the FDP;
4. followed by a Black-Green-Yellow coalition – the so-called “Jamaica Coalition”⁵ – containing the CDU/CSU, Alliance 90/The Greens, and the FDP;
5. a Red-Green-Red coalition, containing the SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens, and The Left (“Die Linke”);
6. and with the current lowest chance of winning: a Red-Black coalition, the current “Grand Coalition”.

We will concentrate on the first five models because polls suggest that a two-party coalition is unlikely to gain a stable majority, and the SPD appears to be extremely reluctant to consider re-entering a coalition with the CDU-CSU after difficult experiences in the current and previous parliaments.

The latest CDU/CSU⁶ results suggest that models 3 and 5 may have the best chances of coming into power.

However, polls and forecasts are now more than ever unreliable. Latest events⁷ may always sway results until the end and, motivated by a growing mistrust of politics across Germany, many voters have not yet made up their minds,⁸ and many will likely not vote at all. Even once the votes have been cast, an unexpected result such as the one Germany saw in 2017 can also easily emerge from talks after the election as a result of unforeseen coalition decisions.⁹

What are the possible effects of the various parties being members of a coalition government on the political make-up of Germany, both domestically and internationally?

1.    Domestic perspective

Currently it seems that Germany will almost certainly end up with a government with Green participation. This would be only the second time that the Greens have had a leading part to play at the federal level (the first was the SPD-Green coalition from 1998 to 2005), and the first time that they could lead a coalition in the Bundestag. It is worth noting that the rise of the Green Party is largely due to the decline of the popularity of the CDU/CSU, which struggled in the 2019 elections for the European Parliament, losing more than a million voters – most of which transferred their support to the Greens.¹⁰

There are three main reasons for the continuation of this trend. Firstly, the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic by the current government (CDU/CSU+SPD) is generally seen by the German public as poor,¹¹ and the politicians in charge have gained a reputation of acting largely for their own benefit during the pandemic.¹² Secondly, the fight between Armin Laschet and Markus Söder for the CDU/CSU chancellorship candidacy resulted in the party losing respect, support and voters. Even when Laschet won, he was accused of lacking the kind of strength of character a chancellor needs, appearing to waver, be nervous, and even to be weak in a variety of situations throughout the campaign. Thirdly, an increasing awareness of the effects of climate change has rapidly spread among the German population. Now more than ever voters are demanding that their government tackle climate change and its implications both domestically and internationally. The recent floods that wreaked havoc across Germany and the intense media coverage they received^{13/14/15/16/17} have only reinforced this focus and pushed people towards one-issue voting, with the floods pointing to an undeniable link between German human security and climate change.

All this leads us to predict a major change in German climate policy, with a huge impact on the current drivers of the economy (the steel and automotive industries) and on energy sources. If this is to be the focus for many German voters, the political landscape as we have previously known cannot and will not remain stagnant.

Another change the Greens could bring is an increased focus on development aid. As part of their comprehensive concept of security, this focus is clearly on the rise, because they claim that “our [i.e. Germany’s] economic and growth model is unfair and has its limits”¹⁸ and are focusing on topics like fair trade, just migration politics, poverty alleviation, human rights, the promotion of democracy and policies to limit climate change.

As they have garnered more visibility over the years, these traditionally “green” topics have also gained traction in other parties. Climate change, human rights, and international aid initiatives have become more commonly referred to by the wide range of parties trying to attract German voters. And if other parties represent core values, many Germans may support them and not the Greens. The Green’s programme will be very expensive,¹⁹ and if it becomes official government policy, it may do so at the expense of the working class. While this makes room for parties with shared values, it also opens up space for parties such as the right-wing AfD, which has its own agenda and is currently spreading disinformation about job security, governmental tax spending, tax increases and personal safety in Germany.

Indeed, such concerns have a powerful influence on voter attitudes: while at the beginning of the election the chances of a Green chancellor were strong, the latest polls indicate that this has become less likely, and that the next chancellor will almost certainly be from the SPD or CDU, which suggests more stability, while a coalition with the Greens could continue to ensure change. What happens will depend on the type of coalition that is formed and the number of seats that each member brings to this coalition. This will strongly affect the future path of Germany’s domestic policy.

2. International perspective

We predict few major changes in German security policy at the international level in the short term – even a Germany under a Green chancellor, or heavily influenced by the popularity of green policies, would not result in radical change. The best example of a policy that will see only minor changes is Germany’s future relationship with the European Union (EU). It can be expected that most parties contesting the election will continue to strengthen the European idea and adopt the current chancellor’s comprehensive approach to security challenges as we have seen the current chancellorship do. Should the CDU/CSU continue to lead the government, Armin Laschet is assumed to largely follow Merkel’s foreign policy^.20 This has become increasingly clear after Merkel’s endorsement of Laschet as the CDU/CSU’s candidate for chancellor. Given the latter’s history as the former representative for Franco-German cultural relations, Germany’s relationship and cooperation with France would likely continue and even be fostered.²¹ The same might even be true under a socialist chancellor, particularly because SPD candidate Olaf Scholz has already been nicknamed “the next Merkel”, from whom we can expect similar approaches to foreign policy – especially considering that he was an important part of Merkel’s government as minister for finance and deputy chancellor. The only unpredictability we see in Germany’s future path is if the Left enters government. Not only does its political agenda demand Germany’s withdrawal from NATO, but some members sympathise with Russia, which could seriously challenge the next government and might even make it implode – particularly when the currently quieter left-leaning part of the SPD begins to gain more influence through common ground.

What will be interesting is the German position concerning the EU Strategic Compass, because developments are already ongoing and will reach their peak later this year. The chances are that the new government will not have sufficient time in office to strongly influence the direction of the Strategic Compass – particularly because, as has been the case in the past, coalition talks and the process of appointing members of the new government will extend until at least the end of October.²²

Germany’s future policy towards NATO will be a bit more complicated, particularly the 2014 pledge to invest 2% of GDP in defence, which will be an issue for a potential government with Green involvement for two reasons. Firstly, the current costs of fighting the pandemic and the future costs of combating climate change will require very high spending levels – which will naturally mean that cuts will have to be made elsewhere. Given the Greens’ lack of focus on the military, these cuts will most likely be in security-related fields. Secondly, although the two wings of the Green Party (“realists” vs. what could be called “fundamentalists”) are more or less in harmony prior to the elections in order to attract voters, there will always be tendencies to return once more to the fundamental idea of the Greens as being the peace party. The German position on the new NATO Strategy (which will be approved in 2022) will be interesting, because, as with the EU Strategic Compass, the new government will not have sufficient time to influence the direction of the new strategy, which will mean that Germany will once again have to adapt to a situation that it may not entirely support. But even the Left Party has already signalled that leaving NATO, which is one of the main points of its policy programme, does not definitely have to be included in any coalition agreement.²³

In terms of Germany’s future relations with China and Russia, it seems that there are two sides to the story. Some parties are not advocating major changes. For example, under an SPD- or CDU/CSU-led coalition, any future policy will probably be one of continuing economic cooperation with China and Russia whilst raising concerns over human rights or international conflicts. Under a Green coalition leadership, or a larger Green participation in the future government as the second-strongest party and therefore probably responsible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the tone might become somewhat more critical of some Chinese and Russian policies and actions, and projects like North-Stream 2 might be endangered.²⁴ As a result, coalition talks with the Greens would tend to take longer to reach some kind of workable agreement on this issue.²⁵

Conclusion

It is clear that the results of the German election will not be fully known until the end of coalition talks towards the end of the year. However, because many party programmes show significant overlap, we can assume a mostly stable transition and no sudden large-scale changes in Germany’s future policy alignment, with a continuation of the main strains of the country’s foreign and security policies.

¹ Bundestagswahlen 2021, 16/09/21, <https://www.bundestagswahl-2021.de/koalitionen/>.

² So called because the colours are the same as those of the Kenyan flag.

³ The colours of the German flag.

⁴ The standard traffic light colours.

⁵ The colours of the Jamaican flag.

⁶ <https://www.blick.ch/ausland/historisches-umfrage-tief-der-partei-und-schande-rufe-in-ihrer-letzten-rede-so-bitter-wird-merkels-abschied-id16812282.html>.

7 <https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2021-09/bundesfinanzministerium-razzia-geldwaesche-strafvereitelung-zoll-spezialeinheit-ermittlungen-bundesjustizministerium>.

⁸ <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bundestagswahl/bundestagswahl-noch-nie-so-viele-unentschlossene-kurz-vor-wahl-17536559.html>.

⁹ See <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sondierung-fdp-bricht-jamaika-sondierungen-ab-1.3755800> and <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-02/fdp-chef-lindner-bevorzugt-koalition-mit-unionskandidat-laschet>.

¹⁰ IISS, “German foreign and security policy after Merkel” (2019), <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/german-foreign-and-security-policy-after-merkel>.

¹¹ <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1221212/umfrage/entwicklung-des-vertrauens-in-die-bundesregierung-waehrend-der-corona-krise/>.

¹² <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/masken-deal-sauter-nuesslein-elfeinhalb-millionen-euro-1.5269605>.

¹³ <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article232546323/Reaktionen-auf-Hochwasser-Der-Klimawandel-ist-in-Deutschland-angekommen.html>.

¹⁴ <https://www.businessinsider.de/politik/deutschland/flutkatastrophe-in-deutschland-was-die-unwetter-mit-dem-klimawandel-zu-tun-haben-a/>.

¹⁵ <https://www.morgenpost.de/vermischtes/article232795969/unwetter-ueberschwemmung-klimawandel-deutschland.html>.

¹⁶ <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wissen/starkregen-hochwasser-klimawandel-1.5354563?reduced=true

¹⁷ <https://www.nzz.ch/wissenschaft/die-ueberschwemmungen-in-deutschland-kamen-durch-ein-zusammenspiel-von-wetterlage-klimawandel-und-geografischen-eigenschaften-der-region-zustande-ld.1635962?reduced=true>.

¹⁸ <https://www.gruene.de/themen/globalisierung>.

¹⁹ <https://pbs.twimg.com/media/E5x4WF6VEAkcuQl?format=jpg&name=medium>.

²⁰ <https://www.dw.com/en/what-will-germanys-foreign-policy-be-after-angela-merkel/a-56722717>.

²¹ Either way, it can be assumed that the new German government will face little external pressure regarding the country’s relationship with the EU, partly due to the likely focus of French president Emmanuel Macron on his country’s internal politics until the French elections in April 2022.

²² Additionally, Germany will have to negotiate French approval of all major changes in the Strategic Compass, because of the strong Franco-German relationship and because Germany began the Strategic Compass process during its EU presidency and France wants to end the process during its presidency.             

²³ <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/rot-gruen-rot-rot-rot-gruene-linke-spd-gruene-1.5410368>.

²⁴ https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/btw21/programmvergleich-aussenpolitik-107.html>.

²⁵ https://www.gruene.de/artikel/mit-dialog-und-haerte>.