Dr Eva Pejsova is a Policy Analyst and Associate Researcher at the French Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) and Senior Advisor of the Asia Pacific Research and Advice Network. She discusses the current security relationship and cooperative security between Europe and Asia in this one-on-one interview with the GCSP.

1.  What is the current security relationship between Europe and Asia?

 It is constantly evolving and improving. Significant progress has been made since the EU’s High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini took office in 2015, marking a shift towards a more autonomous and assertive foreign and security policy. The EU Global Strategy, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) have underscored the EU’s ambition to be a more proactive security player globally,  and this has been positively received in Asia.

Another turning point has been a shift in the EU’s perception of China, which has evolved from offering economic opportunities to increasingly becoming a security challenge, too. The increase in investments into strategic infrastructure (energy, ports, telecommunication), as well as security issues related to the Huawei 5G network implementation and espionage suspicions, for instance, has made Brussels more alert to Beijing’s ability to undermine the EU’s unified front. As a result, we are seeing a change in official discourse, with the EU’s China Strategic Outlook in 2019 referring to China as not only a partner (on global issues, such as climate change), but also an economic competitor and a systemic rival – highlighting Beijing’s tendency to challenge and alter existing global institutional governance structures.     

Not only has Europe become less naive, but it has also become more proactive. The EU’s “Connectivity Strategy”, published in September 2018, which promotes sustainable, rules-based Europe-Asia connectivity with high-quality infrastructure development, is an effort to respond to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” and its extensive connectivity network. Initiatives to enhance political and security-based cooperation with like-minded countries in the region have proliferated, such as the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement and the EU-Vietnam defence and security partnership, which includes the signing of the Framework Participation Agreement, facilitating cooperation between the EU and Vietnam in crisis management.

2.  What does cooperation in Europe-Asia security look like?

 So far, it is mostly related to furthering policy dialogues, public diplomacy and capacity building in functional security areas. The focus is on less “traditional” security issues, such as cyber security (especially in the field of data protection and cyber governance), maritime security (promotion of cooperation in law enforcement, Maritime Situational Awareness [MSA], fisheries and other marine resource protection and conservation, port security), crisis prevention (or preventive diplomacy) and counter-terrorism. A recent concrete example, for instance, has been the 2019 deployment of liaison officers in several EU delegations in Asia to build capacity and coordinate police cooperation in order to address transnational crime, including counter-terrorism, people smuggling, and drug and wildlife trafficking. Extensive cooperation has also taken place countering non-proliferation and research in CBRN (chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear) challenges, with the EU setting up Centres of Excellence for risk mitigation and preparedness around the world, including Southeast Asia.        

3.  What challenges are there? Do you have any specific examples?

 On the European side, the main challenges arise from navigating the discrepancies of the member states’ respective support for, or engagement with, a more robust security policy in regards to Asia. This is partly related to the fact that some of them face more pressing security issues closer to home (Russia, for instance), but also many countries’ growing economic dependency on China. This has been most visible following the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Philippines vs. China case over the South China Sea in 2016, examining the legal status of the various submerged rocks and island features as well as the basis of China’s “historical rights”, in the region, among other things.  The initially strong statement prepared by Brussels was weakened by opposition from Greece and Slovenia, both of whom were wary of jeopardising their relationship with Beijing. Other European countries have opposed EU criticisms of human rights abuses by China for similar reasons.

 On the Asian side, traditional security players (such as Japan and India) tend to view Europe as a purely civilian economic power with little to offer on the security front. Southeast Asian countries have also been reluctant to accept the EU as a security partner. Tensions with Malaysia and Indonesia over palm oil production, or criticisms regarding human rights abuses and undemocratic practices in the Philippines, Myanmar and Cambodia are just some of the persisting challenges preventing stronger or more institutionalized political and security-related cooperation in the region.   

4.  What opportunities are there? Do you have any specific examples?

 One of the main opportunities lies in the current global strategic dynamic, which is being increasingly shaped by the growing rivalry between the US and China. This goes well beyond trade and impacts a vast array of areas – from the economy to technology as well as security. As a consequence, many smaller and middle-sized countries across the Indo-Pacific region find themselves “stuck in the middle” and face a painful strategic choice of having to choose sides. This provides an opportunity for those countries – in Asia, but also in Europe – to step up the promotion of multilateralism, cooperative security and rules-based order, but also to strengthen cooperation in many overlooked “non-traditional” security areas. Concrete areas at the lower end of the security spectrum could include climate change and environmental security, health security, resource conservation (the fight against illegal, unregulated and unreported [IUU] fishing) and other transnational crimes. However, joining forces at the multilateral institutional level (within a UN framework and related institutional oversight) to uphold or jointly negotiate reforms to the current rules-based order is equally, if not more, important.   

5.  Given the current situation facing the world with COVID19, can this be a step towards further cooperation?

The current pandemic definitely underscores the profound interconnection between Asia and Europe, not only in economic terms, but also regarding social mobility and security. The speed and depth of cooperation within the international scientific community, and their willingness to share research, data and practices in order to tackle the effects of the virus, has been unprecedented and can certainly lay the groundwork for closer cooperation in the political realm, too. More than ever, the COVID-19 crisis has revealed the crucial need for policy coordination, transparency and best-practice sharing to address global security challenges and crises as they arise.

6. What are your recommendations for the future as the security landscape evolves?

  Sustaining the current course and continuing existing activities are crucial to make the most of the positive momentum in EU­­­­-Asia security relations. If Europe wants to fulfill its ambition of being a more proactive and independent global security player, it needs to deliver on its promises and demonstrate an effective contribution to regional security with concrete actions. This will be a key challenge for the new leadership in Brussels. More flexibility and creative thinking, such as allowing groups of states with specific interests and capabilities to address individual security hotspots in the region (as was the case in the recent deployment of the EU Maritime Surveillance Mission in the Strait of Hormuz under French leadership) would serve the interests of all of Europe and significantly boost its security profile.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own, and do necessarily reflect the views of the GCSP